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Abstract: The concept of stigma is used to analyse religion and social identity in Japan. 
After the Pacific War, religion in Japan and the social identity it provided can be said to 
have been stigmatised. Today, religion is still highly visible and still used as a mark of social 
identity and, thus, the effects of stigmatisation might still seem to be problematic. It is 
shown that in order to overcome this stigma a discourse has emerged. The discourse is 
associated with a typical reaction to the kind of threat to social identity and esteem that 
stigma can bring. This is made sense of through a conceptualisation of stigma 
incorporating the work of Link and Phelan, Nelson Goodman, and Tajfel and Turner. The 
stigmatisation and destigmatisation of religion and analytic tools to investigate it are 
particularly relevant today given the demonization of Islam. 
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Introduction  
In the past century, the world was riven by two world wars. The latter ended in two 
atomic bombs falling on two unprepared Japanese cities with consequences that are as 
unimaginable as they are horrendous. This event hastened the end of the Pacific War. The 
Japanese surrendered. The Americans came ashore, put an end to the ‘State Shinto’ 
system, had the emperor renounce his divinity, and rewrote the constitution. This very 
process of restructuring Japan ultimately acted to stigmatise religion in Japan to some 
significant degree. Yet, it seems, today religion is still deeply embedded in the culture and 
still provides a social identity. A discourse has thus emerged that aims to destigmatise 
religion in Japan and the social identity it provides. This, it is argued, is done following 
patterns similar to those identified by social psychologists like Tajfel and Turner.   
In order to make sense of this, I'll proceed in the following manner. First, I will define 
what I mean by stigmatisation. I'll use Nelson Goodman's theory of exemplification to make 
sense of this in an original but intuitive manner. Second, I'll outline some strategies that 
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are associated with reacting to negative group identity following social identity theory. Third, 
I'll introduce, briefly, the historic and religious background to our discussions and 
document the ways in which Japanese religion came to be stigmatised. I'll then show the 
way that the stigmatisation is overcome in Japan using the theoretical tools previously 
developed.  
A quick word about my motivation here, which is twofold: First, living in Japan is to 
live in a space which is saturated by religious behaviour, paraphernalia, and intention. Yet, 
most people I meet, as borne out by survey evidence, are resolutely committed to denying 
religious identity. Second, in many places around the world and in cyberspace the 
demonization of religions like Islam is hard to escape. Indeed, I think, it is correct to say 
that Islam today—embodied in items of clothing, behaviours, and its relations (real or 
otherwise) to certain groups and nations—is heavily stigmatised. It thus seems relevant to 
present a case of a stigmatised religion that has undergone the process of destigmatise 
and chart how this was done 
 
The Conceptualistion of Stigma 
 
Link and Phelan 
The study of stigma was introduced by Goffman (1963). It was taken up by 
sociologists and psychologists. It was often used to analyse the relations between various 
social groupings, particularly what might be called disadvantaged groups and the stigma 
they bore and its effects on them. It has been noted that the concept of "stigma" is various 
and often varies from study to study (Stafford & Scott 1986). To overcome this, Link and 
Phelan propose the following conceptualisation of the concept: 
In our conceptualisation, stigma exists when the following interrelated components 
converge. In the first component, people distinguish and label human differences. In the 
second, dominant cultural beliefs link labelled persons to undesirable characteristics—to 
negative stereotypes. In the third, labelled persons are placed in distinct categories so as to 
accomplish some degree of separation of “us” from “them.” In the fourth, labelled persons 
experience status loss and discrimination that lead to unequal outcomes. Finally, 
stigmatisation is entirely contingent on access to social, economic, and political power that 
allows the identification of differentness, the construction of stereotypes, the separation of 
labelled persons into distinct categories, and the full execution of disapproval, rejection, 
exclusion, and discrimination. Thus, we apply the term stigma when elements of labelling, 
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stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination co-occur in a power situation that 
allows the components of stigma to unfold. (Link and Phelan 2001, 367)  
 
We'll take a brief look at each feature in turn as it will help make sense of the way I 
conceptualise stigma.  
Labels 
Link and Phelan say that human differences are labelled and those labels are used 
to categorise people. I assume that a difference is associated with a human individual as 
a whole and the individual is, thereby, labelled. These differences are differences that 
matter, that is, of some salient kind. What makes the difference one of a salient kind seems 
to be down to the social context. Relatedly, they think the benefits of using the term 'label' 
are twofold: (a) it emphasises that a difference that makes a difference is socially 
processed, and (b) the term 'label' does not suggest that the label applies validly (Link and 
Phelan 2001, 368).  
There are a few problems with this: First, talk of labelling differences implies there 
are differences in persons to label. Second, talk of validity, also, suggests that there are 
validity conditions. Presumably, such validity conditions are satisfied based on the 
differences in the persons labelled. Both undermine the stated aim of the use of the term 
'label'. A third issue is that sometimes a shaved head, a branding, an amputated limp, etc. 
are used, instead of labels, to designate stigma. Actual cases attest to this—for example, 
from the Vichy women to AKB48 a shaved head has been a way of stigmatising females by 
male dominated societies who deem them to have offended their patriarchal sensibilities 
in some way (See Stiles 1996, BBC News 2013). 
This kind of embodied symbol points us in the right direction—for we can build upon 
it and keep what is good from what Lean and Phelan value about their use of the term 
'label'. Basically, we can see a stigma in a symbolic fashion. To make this out consider the 
kinds of stigma that Goffman calls our attention to 
First there are abominations of the body - the various physical deformities. Next there are 
blemishes of individual character perceived as weak will, domineering or unnatural passions, 
treacherous and rigid beliefs, and dishonesty, these being inferred from a known record of, 
for example, mental disorder, imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, homosexuality, 
unemployment, suicidal attempts, and radical political behaviour. Finally there are the tribal 
stigma of race, nation, and religion, these being stigma that can be transmitted through 
lineages and equally contaminate all members of a family (Goffman 1963, 3).  
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Each of the three kinds may be said to involve symbols. Abominations of the body 
involve symbols that are embodied in the bodies of individuals. A limp, for example. 
Blemishes of character also involve symbols that are embodied in the bodies of individuals, 
most obviously, in their behaviours—frequent heavy drinking and constant carousing, for 
example. And tribal stigmas involve symbols that are embodied in the relations that the 
individual in question has. For example, those to a sibling who has murdered (May 2000).  
Embodied symbols are, then, either embodied in the body of an individual or 
embodied in the relations he or she has to other individuals and things (including events, 
times and spaces). The differences that Lean and Phelan talk about, too, are embodied in 
these ways—e.g. small foreheads and large faces, cross-eyes, ADHD (Link and Phelan 2001, 
368). These are more like the embodied 'attributes' and 'marks' that they reject (Link and 
Phelan 2001, 368). However, they are symbols and as symbols only have meaning within 
a system of broader meanings and are meaningless otherwise. This means the differences 
in question, though embodied, should be understood to be salient in and only in a social 
context and given meaning through social processes, which meets the concerns of Link 
and Phelan.  
Stereotypes 
Another element in Link and Phelan's conceptualisation of stigma is stereotype. 
From the passage above, Link and Phelan think of a stereotype as a set of undesirable 
characteristics (Link & Phelan 2001, 369). A label links a person to a stereotype. Link and 
Phelan provide some cognitive evidence for the existence of this process and the research 
is somewhat thick on the ground (see Hilton & Hippel 1996).  
We have chosen to replace talk of labels with symbols. If we accept what Link and 
Phelan say about stereotypes, we can think that an embodied symbol (embodied in actual 
bodies, behaviours, or relations) links a person to a stereotype. We should also say that it 
is not just that the symbol links a person to a stereotype, but that that stereotype, by the 
nature of the link, classifies that person by the stereotype. This is developed through 
Nelson Goodman's notion of 'exemplification' below.  
 
Separations 
Labelled individuals are categorised in ways that separate 'them' from 'us'. The 
former is an out-group relative to the latter which is the in-group, according to Link and 
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Phelan. A classification of a stigmatised individual into a group that is distinct from the 
extension of non-stigmatised individuals is involved. This seems true enough. But it might 
do to note that terms like us/them, in-group/out-group, normal /different, etc. are slippery. 
For example, the generically non-different individual may be a target of the 'extra-ordinary' 
for being too much like everyone else (cf. Lange 2014) and being part of a 'them' group 
may be a badge of pride, as it is for bikers and juveniles. 
In the terms we are using, an embodied symbol (in body, behaviour, or relation) 
exemplifies a stereotype that classifies the individual into a group. If we follow Link and 
Phelan, this is an extension that separates that group from others in some kind of 
evaluative fashion. 
 
Status Loss and Discrimination 
Link and Phelan note that status loss and discrimination is often left out of the 
definition of stigma. They feel, however, that it is a necessary condition: "Most definitions 
of stigma do not include this component, but...the term stigma cannot hold the meaning 
we commonly assign to it when this aspect is left out" (Link and Phelan 2001, 370). It 
seems to be the case that, if individuals are labelled, stereotyped, and separated, and all 
that leads to status loss and discrimination (against the backdrop of power relations), then 
they are a stigmatised group (Link and Phelan 2001, 371).  
What do they mean by 'status loss'? This seems to be related to hierarchy. It seems 
that labelled individuals of one type, generally, drop down to lower status positions than 
(better) labelled individuals of another type. I assume that the first set of individuals are 
stereotyped negatively in the way stated above and the latter type not. Thus stigma seems 
to entail low status positions in a hierarchical structure. 
What is meant by 'discrimination'? Examples of discrimination from Link and Phelan 
are rejecting a job application, refusing to rent an apartment, relying on the 
recommendations of a dominant group for job references, construction of buildings that 
hamper the disabled, etc. (Link and Phelan 372-73). It occurs along various dimensions: 
individual and structural and sociological and psychological. These interact and affect each 
other.  
One might accept that to be labelled, stereotyped and negatively categorised can 
lead to a subjective or objective sense of devaluation. However, it neither seems to entail 
a status loss nor discrimination, and neither does status loss entail the latter. I do think 
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the process does, however, entail the likelihood of a loss of status and discrimination. 
Three points may make this clear: First, Link and Phelan write that labelling, stereotyping, 
and classifying constructs a rationale for devaluing and discriminating against individuals 
(Link and Phelan 2001, 371). But a rationale for doing something does not entail the 
motivation for doing it let alone the action—although it probably makes it somewhat likely. 
Second, as noted by Link and Phelan, themselves, even if there are no outward signs of 
status low or discrimination, there may be psychological affects and outcomes (Link and 
Phelan 373-374). But such affects and outcomes may not be negative. For example, 
experiencing stereotyping may not entail loss of status or face discrimination but just an 
awareness that one might obtain a lower status or discrimination. That might prime the 
actor for behaviours that result in purely positive psychological outcomes. Third, labelling, 
stereotyping, classifying, and devaluing does not entail a loss of status and low status does 
not entail discrimination in many actual cases. For example, the underage and unqualified 
may be labelled, stereotyped, classified, and even devalued without suffering a status loss. 
And if they can be considered to have a relatively low status in the relevant hierarchy and 
are excluded and rejected on that basis in the associated contexts, this may not amount 
to discriminatory behaviour. An example is the relationship between a Kōhai (後輩) and 
Senpai (先輩)—that is, the relationship between, for example, a 'junior' and a 'senior' 
member of a club, office, or school, etc. in Japan.  
What status loss and the kinds of discrimination Lean and Phelan mention have in 
common is harm. And, though, I think, such harm is highly likely, it is not entailed. Thus, in 
our terms, an embodied symbol (in body, behaviour, or relation) exemplifies a stereotype 
that is used to classify an individual in a way that has the potential and scope for harm of 
a social, psychological, economic, etc. kind. Though, these are not entailed, one and 
probably many more harmful outcomes are likely.  
Turning to the notion of 'stereotype threat', which is relevant below, it seems also 
the possibility and likelihood of harm is cognitively significant. Stereotype threat occurs in 
situations in which a negative stereotype associated with the performance of individuals of 
a certain group is made relevant to an individual of that group in a certain context, thereby, 
causing the individual to feel threatened and, ultimately, perform differently from an 
individual of the same group to whom the stereotype was not made relevant or from an 
individual of a group to whom the stereotype is not relevant. Since the stereotype links the 
relevant individuals to poor performances, the individual in whom the stereotype threat is 
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induced, ends up acting in a way that does not meet the evaluative standards that are met 
by the individuals to whom the threat is not made relevant or is not relevant. This can be 
done simply by implying the relevance of the stereotype to the context. This has been 
shown to be a phenomenon that can be induced in any number of stereotyped groups of 
individuals with respect to academic stereotypes, athletic stereotypes, etc. (Steele, 
Spencer & Aronson 2002). It can even be induced in groups, who though negatively 
stereotyped in some ways, enjoy hegemonic privilege in most social spheres. (Steele, 
Spencer & Aronson 2002, 386).  Thus, via negative stereotyping, the possibility and 
likelihood of harm, and the acknowledgement of this as a cognitively significant threat is 
produced.  
Power 
It seems to me Link and Phelan are entirely right to say that stigma emerges against 
a background of power relations. It, also, seems correct to say that stigmatisation may 
occur in the struggle for and maintenance of power. And it might even be right to say, power 
entails stigmatisation. I don't assume the latter is correct, just that it could be so. So the 
processes above plays out against a background of power relations maintaining or instating 
them and in this sense they are arbitrary. 
 
Nelson Goodman 
There was a lot to be drawn from the work of Lean and Phelan. I would like, now, to 
take what we have learnt from them in a new direction. I would like to introduce some ideas 
from the philosopher Nelson Goodman.  
Goodman (1976) gave us a theory of symbols.1 Symbols denote and exemplify. It is 
exemplification that is important here. A symbol that exemplifies does so by denoting a 
predicate and having that predicate classify it. For example. Käthe Kollwitz's painting 
Woman with Dead Child denotes the predicate 'is sad' and that predicate, thereby, 
classifies the art work as a sad painting. And it becomes an example of a sad painting 
through this process. This kind of process, for Goodman, is entirely conventional and, 
therefore, social and contingent. We have taken embodied symbols as fundamental to our 
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embodied in relations. These symbols may be understood as symbols that exemplifies in 
Goodman's terms.   
Following Goodman's general outline, we can think of something like a shaved head 
as exemplifying. For example, conventionally and in the relevant context, it denotes 'is 
someone who has fraternised with the enemy'. Denoting that predicate classifies the 
exemplifying individual as someone who has fraternised with the enemy. In effect, the 
individual constitutes an example by possessing a certain embodied attribute that also acts 
as a symbol just as a painting constitutes an example by possessing a certain concrete 
quality that acts as a symbol. Likewise with behaviour. The behaviours of an individual will, 
given the relevant conventions and contexts, denote a predicate that will classify him or 
her and render the individual actor an example of such and such a type. Thus, if a male's 
behaviours denote the predicate 'is effeminate', it classifies the actor in question as an 
individual that is an effeminate male. The individual in question becomes an example of 
the kind of individual in question through this process. The same can be said of a relation—
a relation is an embodied symbol that exemplifies a predicate that classifies the individual 
who bears the relation. So consider an ex-convict. The relation in question denotes the 
predicate 'acted criminally’, thereby, classifying the individual as someone that is related 
to crime. The individual is an example of an individual who bears such a relation. Stigma, 
in this sense, is embodied in bodies, behaviours, and relations which are symbolic and 
exemplifying. What is exemplified is conventional and contextual and, in this sense, 
contingent and, assuming dependence on a political base, most often arbitrary. 
Following Goodman and like-minded philosophers, we can note that predicates are 
not isolated, that is, they do not float free in the air and do not fall from the sky fully formed. 
Rather, predicates form families of alternatives like hot/cold, wide/long/high/deep, etc. 
These families are called schema. And these schema are dependent on historical and 
contextual factors: "What the admitted alternatives are is of course less often determined 
by declaration than by custom and context" (Goodman 1976, 72). Further, in relation to a 
realm of objects, these schema constitute what are called systems. Relating a schema to 
a realm of objects is to systematically associate predicates with objects.  
In terms of our discussion, embodied symbols are associated with predicates. These 
predicates are schematic. As they apply to individuals, classifying and sorting them, they 
constitute a system. Such a system is historically determined and context dependent and 
played out against a background of power-relations and struggles, arbitrary.  
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Another thing to emphasise is that, in line with what exemplification is, embodied 
symbols make examples of individuals. To be made an example of a negative predicate 
can be, of course, highly distressing, and where the outcomes associated with the 
predicate are negative and arbitrary, highly threatening and acknowledged to be so. This 
seems likely to be a component of stereotype threat. A related point is that the kinds of 
examples made may relate to past, present, possible or generic typicality. For example, a 
relation that connects an individual to a historic theft may denote the predicate ‘is a thief’. 
That predicate classifies the individual and presents him or her as an example of a thief. 
But, dependent on convention and context, the predicate may classify him or her as a past, 
present, possible or generic thief. The possibility that relations to past events colour the 
present or future or classify one as generically typical in a conventional and arbitrary 
manner is also threatening and more often than not acknowledged to be so. In a sense 
then it is exemplification that leads to stereotype threat.  
But what of stereotypes? A stereotype may be thought of as an entrenched 
predicate. Such a predicate, of course, can be complex. For example, a symbol of the type 
in question may denote several predicates which can be thought of as a single conjunction 
and, thus, a single predicate. An understanding of stereotypes may, then, be explained 
through exemplification. A stereotype is constituted by an entrenched predicate, singular 
or complex, that classifies an individual through the process of exemplification. These are 
threatening to the individual when that is done in a way that has the potential and scope 
for the kind of outcomes, social, psychological, economic, etc. that are harmful to the 
individual. That is threatened given the nature of the predicate, its entrenchment and 
systematic application through the exemplification process, which serves to make an 
example of the individual categorised. That is, the induced threat a stigmatised individual 
may feel from a stereotype when that stereotype is made relevant, even in some very 
minimal way, to his or her situation, interactions, and outcomes produces threat. As such 
an individual's behaviour may be effected negatively. With all this in mind, I want to now 
consider how groups may react to stigmatisation.  
 
Tajfel and Turner 
To start with, as mentioned, there is already stereotype threat to acknowledge. In 
terms of a stigmatised individual the individual bears an attribute that exemplifies an 
entrenched and systematically applied predicate of the kind in question impacting on 
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behaviour negatively. For example, the individual may embody a particular skin-colour and 
in the relevant context, that may denote a predicate like ‘has low mathematical ability’. 
When placed in a context which evaluates such ability on being reminded of the predicate 
the individual's body, in the present case, exemplifies, the individual is threatened and runs 
a higher risk of actually falling into the extension of the predicate for no other reason than 
the existence of the threat (i.e. Aronson et al. 1998) 
Nevertheless, stereotyping, though it can work to the detriment of the individuals 
involved, provides categorisations that may also work to the benefit—particularly with 
respect to ‘self-esteem’. That is, even if a stereotype becomes a threat to performances in 
situations where they are induced, it may not affect esteem negatively and can, in fact, 
help to raise self-esteem. For example, Crocker and Major have shown that, if the context 
is right, an individual who is associated with a group that is associated with a negative 
stereotype can protect self-esteem by (a) blaming negative outcomes on prejudice; (b) 
making in-group comparisons; (c) placing lesser value on those things that individuals of 
the group are stereotyped to do badly with. At base, identifying with a stigmatised group 
allows one to protect self-esteem through these strategies (Crocker & Major 1989, 620). 
This, then, points to the possibility of working with a negative stereotype to a positive end.  
In the terms we have been discussing, symbols are embodied in individuals and 
they denote well-entrenched predicates that may harm and that are acknowledged to be 
of this type. They classify the individual that embodies the symbol making that individual 
an example of the set of individuals that embody the symbol in question. In this way, the 
individual may, too, identify himself or herself with the set of individuals systematically 
classified by the predicate in question, and even if this set of individuals is a stigmatised 
set of individuals. Individuals that do not embody the symbol in question may not be 
identified with and by exemplifying an alternative predicate, according to the schema in 
question, may systematically be identified as unstigmatised. Relations between the two 
sets of individuals may be used to maintain self-esteem, for example, even where the broad 
environment is such that the predicate exemplified by a member of the stigmatised set is 
likely to do harm and is acknowledged to be of this type by the stigmatised individual. That 
is, following Crocker and Major, by (a) identifying negative outcomes associated with the 
stigmatised group with causal processes that stem from the non-stigmatised grouping; (b) 
valuing sets of attributes associated with the latter and devaluing those associated with 
those of the former; (c) making in-group comparisons. 
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This kind of thinking has its origins in Tajfel and Turner. An introduction to the most 
important concepts and themes from their work for the conceptualisation of stigma and its 
resolution is briefly provided next and integrated into the present conceptualisation.  
 
Group Membership 
For Tajfel and Turner (1986) group membership is defined in the following manner: 
“[T]he essential criteria for group membership, as they apply to large-scale social 
categories, are that the individuals concerned define themselves and are defined by others 
as members of a group” (Tajfel & Turner 1986, 40). I assume the individuals concerned 
and the others are of a significant number and both parties define the individual in question 
as of the same group.  
Collections of individuals of this kind constitute the members of the group. They can, 
according to Tajfel and Turner, be thought of as thinking of themselves as group members, 
sharing emotional involvement in the definition of themselves as group members, and 
achieving some kind of consensus about the evaluation of the group and their membership 
of it (Tajfel & Turner 1986, 40). The first obviously follows from the definition. Given that 
group membership is likely in the social setting to provide social merit or demerit, which 
affects identity and esteem, the latter two consequences are also likely to obtain.  
 
Social Identity 
Social groups provide their members with a means of identity. This is termed "social 
identity" (Tajfel & Turner 1986, 40). Social identity is defined as: “[T]hose aspects of an 
individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which he [or she] perceives 
himself [or herself] as belonging” (Tajfel & Turner 1986, 40). To make explicit the relation 
of social identity to group membership we can add an additional clause: social identity is 
defined as those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories 
to which that individual perceives himself or herself belonging and is perceived as 
belonging to by a significant number of others, similar and different.  
Social groups also provide individuals with a means to manage their identity. It is 
assumed that: First, individuals strive for a positive self-image in order to protect self-
esteem; Second, social groups and categories are associated with positive or negative 
connotations; Third, positive comparisons between groups produce high prestige, negative 
ones low prestige. From these assumptions, Tajfel and Turner think the following three 
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outcomes follow: First, individuals aim to preserve a positive social identity; Second, thus, 
one’s group is positively differentiated from an other’s group; Third, when social identity is 
wanting, individuals will either leave their group or look for ways to make favourable 
comparisons with other groups—which leads to the need to differentiate from other groups 
(Tajfel & Turner 1986, 40-41). In order to do so, individuals must have internalised the 
group membership as part of their self-concept; circumstances must befit comparison; and 
a relevant group must be found to compare to (Tajfel & Turner 1986, 41). The aim is to 
provide a beneficial comparison. 
 
Responding to Negative Social Identity 
In relation to negative or threatened social identity. Two responses are highlighted. 
First, “social mobility”, that is, the movement of an individual from a group with a negative 
social identity to a group with a positive social identity. Second, where that is not possible, 
“social creativity”. That is, where: “The group members…seek positive distinctiveness for 
the in-group by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative situation” (Tajfel & 
Turner 1986, 43). It becomes the most important strategy when, “the barriers (objective, 
moral and ideological prohibitions) to leaving one’s group are strong." Under such 
circumstances, "unsatisfactory social identity may stimulate social creativity that tends to 
reduce the salience of the subordinate/dominant group conflict of interest” (Tajfel & Turner 
1986, 44). Competition with subordinate groups is most likely, but a group may compete 
with a dominant group when that group is a viable source of comparison (Tajfel & Turner 
1986. 45). When the situation is seen as both unstable and unjust, but there is no room 
for social mobility, social creativity emerges (Tajfel & Turner 1986, 45).2 
This theory of social identity can now be incorporated into the picture of stigma I am 
presenting here: As stated, symbols are embodied in individuals, in bodies, behaviours and 
relations. These symbols denote predicates. In the present context, these symbols denote 
well-entrenched predicates i.e. stereotypes. These well-entrenched predicates, in turn, 
classify the individual that embodies the symbol. In this way, the individual becomes an 
example of like individuals. An individual of this set of individuals, following Tajfel and 
Turner, can be said to have class membership of the relevant grouping just in case that 
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number of others see that individual as a member of that group. Given the conventional 
nature of the symbol embodied by the individual in question and a systematic use, this is 
likely to be satisfied. The individual in question so far as he or she has class membership 
may associate his or her identity with that class and thus obtain a social identity. Social 
esteem is associated with a positive or negative social identity based on class membership. 
High self-esteem is consistent with positive social identity; low self-esteem with negative 
social identity. Esteem is a function of the social identity that one receives from one’s class 
membership. I think, we must add that conventionally, the kind of symbol in question may 
denote several predicates, provide several class memberships, and a conjunctive identity 
(or some equivalent of that). Given the nature of stigma, embodied symbols denote, at 
least, some heavily entrenched negative predicates that classify individuals into negatively 
categorised groups as examples of individuals to whom the predicate applies making it 
likely that negative outcomes obtain for them. Thus, it is, at first blush, highly likely that the 
kind of class membership in question leads to a negative social identity and, thereof, low 
self-esteem. Assuming, then, that individuals try to preserve self-esteem through a positive 
self-identity, and a positive self-identity is associated with a social identity reliant on one’s 
class membership and the way it is evaluated, positively or negatively, and assuming that 
individuals want to skirt the threat and likelihood of low status and discriminatory 
behaviour against them, which is likely to emerge from this or that negative class 
membership, two options present themselves: to become socially mobile or socially 
creative.  
I find these two options too vague for our purposes and would like to develop two 
related kinds of mobility that I will call “symbolic mobility” and “systematic creativity”. 
Symbolic mobility is defined as a change in social identity that involves erasing the symbol 
that leads to an unwanted social identity or outcomes. Systematic creativity is defined as 
a change in social identity that involves the reassignment of the denotative relation 
between symbol and predicate. An example of the first may be the stigma that accrues 
from hair colour. Hair colour can be a symbol of, for example, age and conclude in detriment 
to the individual who embodies the symbol. A change in hair colour erases the symbol and 
the social identity it implies and related outcomes. An example of the second, systematic 
creativity, may be where stigma accrues from skin colour. In such a case, symbolic mobility 
is not practically possible since skin colour is difficult to erase. However, a change in what 
skin colour as an embodied symbol denotes may be of some advantage to the individuals 
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who embody the symbol in question. For example, black skin may denote 'is black-skinned’ 
and classify that individual as a black-skinned individual. That association will stand. But 
others may be reassigned. For example, a narrative or discourse may be constructed that 
eliminates negative associations with black skin and beauty. In the discourse, black skin 
may now come to denote 'is beautiful,' thus classifying the black-skinned individual as 
beautiful, and a typical example of beauty. The outcome is a conjunctive social identity 
provided by membership of two classes. An individual embodies a symbol, black skin, which 
denotes both ‘is black-skinned’ and ‘is beautiful’ and classifies the relevant set of 
individuals as black and beautiful and allows for the correspondent social identity to 
emerge and be taken up. It must, also, be noted that no comparisons seem to be necessary 
to the emergence of this identity, just the reassignment of the symbol-predicate relation. 
Perhaps, though, it is practically unavoidable since non-black skin may not be understood 
as related to beauty especially where prior negative associations stem from groups who do 
not embody black skin. An admixture of symbolic mobility and systematic creativity may 
emerge through a discourse that is ‘colour blind’. That is, where embodied symbols like 
skin colour systematically take no reference.3 
Stigmatisation does not just take the form of conjunctive social identities which are 
reformed through systematic creativity, but conditional, disjunctive, etc. identities, which 
may be revalued. Logically this must be true, since conjunctions are equivalent to 
conditionals and disjunctions with negation. It may do to analyse stigma and reactions to 
it in terms of these other relations. For example, an individual may have lost or not been 
born with the use of his or her legs. This may be understood as an embodied symbol. It 
may, conventionally and systematically, denote the predicate 'is disabled'. That predicate 
may classify the individual as a disabled individual and that may work to make the 
individual an example of a disabled individual. At the same time, the conventional 
systematisation of the predicate 'disabled' may be associated with the predicate 
'unproductive' in the following conditional relation: 'if an individual is disabled, then the 
individual is also unproductive'. In this way, the embodied symbol classifies an individual 
as disabled and by implication unproductive. Thus, an individual who embodies the kind of 
symbol in question is rendered an example of an unproductive individual. Two classes (a 





Malik, L  The stigmatisation of religion in japan and the response to it “in	Journal	of	the	Sociology	and	Theory	of	Religion.	Vol	1	(2015),	e-
ISSN		2255-2715. 
 
The likelihood of negative outcomes (psychological, sociological, etc.) is extreme and 
further implications may be systematised and, thus, such class membership and the 
conditional identity that emerges is likely to be rejected. It is difficult to see, in most 
contexts, how the symbolic mobility strategy might be adopted, given, that is, how 
entrenched the relation between the symbol and predicate is (cf. Atkinson 2015). Thus, 
systematic creativity is much more likely to be adopted. It is, again, easy to see how this 
might work. Conditionals are negated by accepting the antecedent but negating the 
consequent. A discourse that systematically associates the symbol in question with 
disability and productivity, reassigns the symbol in a way that classifies the individual as 
disabled and productive, and makes of him or her an example of both disability and 
productivity and successfully negates the inference. That undercuts the likelihood of harm 
associated with the unwanted conditional identity noted above. 
Stigmatised individuals, then, who embody the symbols that denote predicates that classify 
them in their bodies, behaviours, and relations that are very difficult to erase may find symbolic 
mobility particularly difficult. For example, individuals with a particular skin tone, individuals that 
follow and value certain religious practices and behaviours, and individuals that exist in a particular 
space and are related, thereby, to a race or nationality. For these individuals, systematic creativity 
is urgent in order to facilitate positive group connotations, social identity, and maintain self-esteem. 
Tajfel and Turner say that that requires differentiation, which requires a space in which 
negative/positive comparisons can be made and an alien group with which these comparisons can 
be made. Following Tajfel and Turner groups can either compare to other stigmatised groups or re-
imagine intergroup relations i.e. “by redefining or altering the elements of the comparative 
situation” (Tajfel & Turner 1986, 43). However, as we pointed out, the comparative element is not 
necessary to a reassignment and systematic mobility, but it seems likely. It is this kind of strategy 
that will be important below. This can, as we have seen, be thought of as achieved simply through 
the reassignment of symbol-predicate values, for example, through a new narrative or discourse 
which retains some values and reassigns others. 
It is through stigma interpreted as above through embodied symbolisation, 
exemplification, class membership, social identity and the protection of self-esteem 
through systematic creativity that one can understand both the stigmatised nature of 
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The Stigmatisation and Destigmatisation of Religion in Japan  
 
Religion in Japan  
Shintō is sometimes thought to be the indigenous religion of Japan. However, it has 
continental forebears (De Bary 2001, 17). Moreover, it was not homogenous in Japan at 
the time it was first defined (De Bary 2001, 17). This heterogeneous set was defined as 
Shintō in opposition to the incoming of Buddhism in the sixth century (Kuroda 1981). It has 
been reimagined from time to time, for example, in the late 19th to early 20th century period 
(Chamberlain 2012). Japanese religious history, of course, is not even a story about two 
religions. Indeed, Confucianism from Japan's early period was, perhaps, even more 
influential than Buddhism, which itself was more influential than the Shintō tradition. 
Prince Shōtoku (573-621) in emulating the Chinese model centralised the state and 
produced a written constitution following Confucian principles. (De Bary 2001, 41). Even 
during the State Shintō period, which will be of interest to us, from the beginning of Meiji 
to the end of the Second World War, when State Shintoism came to dominate the 
relationship between divinity and national identity, Confucian ideas had a role to play. For 
example, on the Imperial Rescript on Education, a prominent government publication that 
helped define the period in question (Duke 2009, 366). 
There have been, then, a number of religious influences on Japanese thought and 
this has consistently be related to identity. Many authors have commented on this close 
relation: “Questions  of  social  and  political  identity  in Japan  have  almost  always  been  
accompanied  by perceptions  and  decisions  about  religion” (Pye 1996). And, again, in 
the following passages we find similar sentiments: 
 
From the beginning of documented history throughout the centuries, we find, among 
scholars and priests of Shintō, Buddhism and Confucianism alike, a definite religious 
debate in Japan about the question of what it means to be ‘Japanese’ as distinguished from 
the outside world  (Antoni 2001, 10). 
 
[Since] the early 1880s…the bureaucracy in charge of religious affairs promoted Shintō as 
a public expression of Japanese ethnic identity and loyalty to the throne that all imperial 
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In the last passage Helen Hardacre speaks of a period of history that will be 
important to us below. Ian Reader identifies similar links between religion and identity in 
contemporary Japan (Reader 2001, 14). Thus, religion in Japan, up to today seems to be 
various and entwined with definitions and understandings of identity, sometimes singularly 
sometimes interrelatedly.  
As said, the period of time most important to us is that stretching from the beginning 
of the Meiji Period in 1868 to the end of the Second World War. At this time religion was 
linked to national identity in a very particular fashion and it was this particularism manner 
that caused the relationship between religion in Japan and national identity to be so heavily 
stigmatised in the years to come. That is, of course, important to our discussion below and 
we’ll take a brief look at the relationship between religion and national identity at this time.  
To define a nation, as with a group, certain predicates are associated with it. These 
associations it seems safe to assume are assigned discursively and systematically, in the 
sense given above, through application of a schema to a domain of reference, the people. 
Thus, the very particular link between religion and national identity in question can be 
understood to have been a function of a very particular discourse that was systematically 
organised through social processes.  The discourse in question seems to have been a 
discourse sponsored by the Meiji and proceeding governments and certain elites. This 
discourse associated certain religious qualities with Japan, its emperor, and his subjects: 
Japan was said to have a divine origin and divine teleology; the emperor's family line was 
said to be directly related to divinity and the emperor a living deity; and the people of Japan 
were said to be subjects of the emperor and obliged to serve him unconditionally. These 
discursive associations, then, functioned to link certain religious features with a very 
particular and distinct national identity.  
A number of documents exhibit the elements mentioned and their relation to the 
nation. The Meiji Constitution, for example, was a dedication to the ancient form of 
governance given to Japan by its ancestral origins and it called on those sacred spirits to 
both witness and help maintain the laws of the constitution. Lineal succession was talked 
of as eternal and the emperor declared sacred and inviolable and the people of Japan were 
considered to be subjects of the emperor with certain duties. In further documents to come 
the link between religion and national identity was only secured. Consider the government 
document the Fundamental Principles of the National Polity, which links the emperor, the 
people, and the nation in the following manner (“Amaterasu Ōmikami” refers to the deity 
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that created Japan in the creation myth most closely associated with the Kojiki, a scared 
Shintō text): 
 
Our country is established with the emperor, who is a descendent of Amaterasu Ōmikami, 
as her centre, and our ancestors as well as we ourselves have constantly beheld in the 
emperor the fountain head of her life and activities (Fundamental Principles of the National 
Polity, from Ives 2009, 46).  
 
The Imperial Rescript on Education, a short document, but one obliged to be taught 
in schools and kept together with the emperor's portrait in complete safety, relates religion 
to nation in the following manner: "I, the Emperor, think that my ancestors and their religion 
founded my nation a very long time ago" (Japan 1890). In fact, this document took on a 
sacred qualities. It was famously distributed to schools (with a portrait of the emperor) and 
was expected to be looked after even at the cost of one’s life (Woodard 1972, 166).  
Indeed, that such documents were to be considered sacred came to be viewed as 
a norm. This is from the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (大政翼賛会  Taisei 
Yokusankai), a political organisation, in a time when all political parties had been dissolved, 
dedicated to the furtherance of imperial rule: "We shall hold as sacred the rescripts issued 
by generations of emperors" (Lu 1996, 441).  
Again, the link between religion and nation passing through the emperor and his 
blood line is provided in a document called the Way of the Subject: "The Imperial Family is 
the fountain source of the Japanese nation, and national and private lives issue from this" 
(Japan August 1941, section V). This document also called for subjects to disregard the 
private self in service of the emperor and the public good of the Emperor Institution, as it 
is sometimes referred to, and identified this with the significance of national life:  
 
The way of the subjects is to be loyal to the Emperor in disregard of self, thereby supporting 
the Imperial Throne coextensive with the Heavens and with the Earth…Our lives will become 
sincere and true when they are offered to the Emperor and the state. Our own private life 
is fulfilment of the way of the subjects; in other words, it is not private, but public, insofar 
as it is held by the subjects supporting the Throne...All must be unified under the Emperor. 
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This document is also clear about the world mission Japan has, which is manifest 
through the expansionist Hakkō Ichiu (八紘一宇) principle: "the benevolent rule of the 
emperor may be extended so as to encompass the whole world" (Japan August 1941, 
section IV).  
So it seems that religion has had a role to play in Japan and religion and nation were 
related prior to the end of the war in a very particular manner. A discourse emerged that 
associated a divine origin, a divine teleology, a divine emperor, and a divine obligation to 
serve him with the Japanese nation and its people. The discourse can, thus, be thought of 
as a systematic function from a certain set of religious qualities associated with Japan, its 
creation, teleology, the emperor and his subjects to a national or social identity. However, 
this discourse and thus the relationship between religion and identity it provided were to 
become heavily stigmatised.   
The Stigmatization of Religion in Japan  
The Way of the Subject, noted above, sought to provide a legitimisation of imperial 
expansionism. And in 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbour and precipitated war with the 
United States. Japan lost this war. The position that Japan found itself in after the loss was 
dire. There were the atomic bombings; millions dead; over 70% of inhabitants had 
abandoned Tokyo and 65% of its inhabitable places had been destroyed and more in other 
cities; homelessness ran into the millions, made up of demobbed soldiers, widows and 
orphans; there was a lack of food and communicable disease spread easily; crime, 
corruption, and state sanctioned prostitution contributed to shortages of supplies and 
disease; and under such conditions anxiety and trauma were not hard to find (Dower 2000). 
It was religion that was officially blamed for this outcome. The ‘Shintō Directive’, one of the 
first documents to be published by the occupying forces, explicitly established a link 
between religion, ideology, and suffering. It was stated that religion had helped form “an 
ideology [that] contributed to [the people’s] war guilt, defeat, suffering, privation, and 
[Japan’s] deplorable condition” at that time (GHQ December 1945).  
It is also important to note that religion of the kind in question was also associated 
with militarism and ultranationalism by the Shintō Directive. It thus states that part of its 
mission is “to prevent a recurrence of the perversion of Shinto theory and beliefs into 
militaristic and ultra-nationalistic propaganda designed to delude the Japanese people and 
lead them into wars of aggression” (GHQ December 1945). That kind of militarism was 
linked to the teachings, beliefs and theories associated with what was designated ‘State 
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Shintoism’ to pick out the particularism world view and associated identity highlighted in 
the previous section. 
This document’s stated mission was not only to allocate blame but to negate the 
equivalence relation between state and religion. Thus, on the one hand, its mission was 
put like this: “The purpose of this directive is to separate religion from the state to prevent 
misuse of religion for political ends…” (GHQ December 1945). To further cement this 
separation a block on the power of religion to influence public life and education was 
instated. On the other hand, the directive sought to pluralise religious space and to remove 
official interferences that might retard this process. Thus, freedom of religion was an 
important part of the stated aim of this document. The sentence above continues like this:  
“…and to  put  all  religions,  faiths,  and  creeds  upon  exactly  the  same legal  basis,  
entitled  to  precisely  the  same  opportunities  and  protection” (GHQ December 1945). 
Indeed, Woodard, part of the mission to Japan and later a scholarly contributor to our 
understanding of Japan at that time, writes that SCAP (Supreme Commander of Allied 
Powers) wanted  “to develop a desire for freedom of religion” in Japan (Woodard 1972, 
179). The message was echoed in various other documents that followed. The constitution 
being one prominent example; others being the Fundamental Law of Education of 1947, 
the Religious Corporations Ordinance of 1945, and later the Religious Juridical Persons 
Law of 1951, and so on.  
To further the break of equivalence, several steps were taken. A space was created 
in which the equivalence of religion and state was concretely dismantled in the minds of 
the Japanese people. For example, concrete actions, including voluntary and involuntary 
dissolutions and encouragements to leaders to step down and a few purges, were taken 
against religious groups who seemed to exhibit the qualities associated with the religion of 
the past and who sought to influence public life in similar ways. An early English language 
record of this is found in the Reminisces of Post-War Japan series (1965). On the other 
hand, SCAP set up sections like Civil Information and Education (CI&E) in order to manage 
the reeducation of the Japanese people which included a syncretic, pluralistic, tolerant 
reorientation toward religion: “Many of the CI&E educational films showed an imagined 
America, a harmonious, prosperous society free from racial, class, gender, or religious 
conflicts” (Tsuchiya 2002, 204). In addition, the obligatory tribute to local shrines collected 
by community associations became a matter of choice although its implementation 
remained problematic for a time (Woodard 1972).  
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Thus religion was associated causally with war, suffering and death; particularism; 
militarism and ultranationalism; the equivalence between religion and state legally 
prohibited; and steps taken to avoid the conflation of religion and state and religion and 
politics through dissolutions of problematic religious groups, a tolerance of all other 
religious entities, and processes of reeducation and reorientation.  
Today, the contemporary understanding of pre-occupation religion in Japan is 
consistent with the discourse that was disseminated by the occupying forces. For example, 
in a paper reviewing theories of ‘civil religion’ in Japan, Okuyama (2012) cites several 
authors who manifest the paradigmatic view. For example, Christi and Dawson (2007) 
identify three kinds of civil religion: a totalitarian one; a sacred form of nationalism; and a 
historical form that serves elites. They associate pre-occupation religion with the first and 
second types (Okuyama 2012, 65). Robertson (2009) is another prominent example. He 
divides civil religions and political religions (theocracies). Giving examples of the latter kind, 
Robertson writes: “[S]ocieties with political religions (or theocracies) have included Nazi 
Germany, contemporary North Korea, and the period of State Shinto in Japan 
(approximately 1890 until 1945)” (Robertson  2009,  453). A third example is drawn from 
Takayama (1993): “With Japan’s unconditional surrender in 1945,” he says, “the Allied 
powers demanded the abolition of the Japanese civil religion moulded during the 
nationalistic and ultranationalistic periods” (In Okuyama 2012, 69). That this discourse is 
paradigmatic is also attested to by those who bemoan the ostracising of Shintoism in 
particular (e.g. Nishi 1982). Parenthetically, it should be noted that other religions in Japan 
contributed to the ultranationalist paradigm at that time. Nichiren Buddhism is one case in 
point; Christianity, however, another (Chamberlain 2012).  
Thus, we have some sense of the stigmatisation of religion that occurred in Japan 
after the war. I want now, then, to set the process of stigmatisation and destigmatisation 
out in terms of the theory developed above.  
 
The Process of Destigmatisation  
In the present context, we have seen that a discourse associated religion with 
national identity through divine origins, teleology, and the emperor’s divinity. This discourse, 
however, was supplanted by a discourse that associated religion with a negative set of 
predicates. This discourse classified religion and religious actors in Japan as particularism 
and antagonist to contrarian voices; causally related to war, death, and suffering; 
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militaristic and ultranationalist; and the force behind a dangerous equivalence of religion 
and state (a relation that came to be legally proscribed). This list of associations may be 
thought of as a predicate and, in the relevant sense, a stereotype, call it ‘is S’ or just S for 
short. S may also be thought of as synonymous with acting theocratically, following 
Robertson (2009) (and others) quoted above. Because the occupation discourse has 
dominated and is concurrently paradigmatic in conventional scholarly discussion, the 
predicate is entrenched and can, therefore, be thought of as a stereotype. We can, thereof, 
say that the discourse associates religion in Japan prior to occupation with the stereotype 
S and, by implication, theocratic behaviour.  
On our conceptualisation, stigmatised groups posses bodily, behavioural or 
relational symbols that exemplify predicates which classify them and make them examples 
of the kinds of individuals that fall into the extension of the entrenched predicates. Such 
classifications lead to the likelihood of negative outcomes. In the present case, then, 
something like the following might be said to take place: an individual comes to embody a 
symbol that denotes (or implies) S and S classifies and presents that individual as an 
example of someone that engages in theocratic behaviour. This suggests class 
membership and class membership suggests identity and such an identity is liable to 
engender negative outcomes, not least of psychological import (low self-esteem, guilt, etc.). 
It is very unlikely that such class membership will be accepted and that such a social 
identity is adopted or maintained. As stated above, strategies above are available that can 
be adopted in reaction to this set of possibilities: symbolic mobility or systematic creativity. 
To understand the appropriate type we need to understand just what symbol threatens the 
kind of classification in question.  
There are two main symbols: First, behaviours and practices. Second, historical 
relations. In Japan, it appears as if people engage in various religious behaviours and 
wilfully participate in certain events, celebrations, ceremonies, rites, etc. For example, the 
majority of people visit graves (Hakamairi墓参) in line with the Buddhist calendar, pray at 
shrines for the upcoming New Year (Hatsumōde 初詣 ), commemorate the dead with 
Buddhist ceremonies (Hōji法事), etc. People also seem to exist in a space saturated with 
religious paraphernalia. There are shrines easily found standing on public streets and 
private shrines (Kamidana 神棚) and religious altars (Butsudan 仏壇) in many houses. 
Moreover, there is a sense of sacred things and such things are treated with respect and 
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reverence e.g. one’s ancestors. There is a sense, also, of cultural value to the things 
mentioned and the practices done.  They are, in fact, deeply embedded in the culture of 
the nation. On the other hand, the historical relations in question are paradigmatic, as 
already shown. Therefore, we have behaviours which act as symbols and historical 
relations that act as symbols. Each may denote S or each may denote religious behaviours 
that imply S (or, at the very least, the respective possibilities—past, present, future, or 
generic). If so, it doesn't seem that in either case symbolic mobility is possible. Culturally 
embedded religious behaviours are hard to do away with, global historical truths even 
harder. Rather, it is systematic creativity that is called for. Following the examples provided, 
that should be achieved by another discourse. Certain discursive strategies might be 
undertaken to this end: the reassignment of the symbol-predicate relation or the negation 
of the implication from religious behaviour or history to S. In fact, all of these strategies can 
be found. Here are a number of such strategies observable in Japan.  
Syncretism, Pluralism, Tolerance 
Today the syncretic, pluralistic and tolerant nature of religion in Japan is stressed. 





2015).   
 
We  visit  Shinto  shrines  at  New  Years,  get  married  in  churches,  and  follow Buddhist  
funeral  rites.  It  is  difficult  for  Americans  and  Europeans,  who  follow religions  like  
Judaism  and  Christianity,  whose  key  note  is  monotheism,  to  get  to grips with this  way  
of life. 
 
Syncretism and pluralism are emphasised to go hand in hand with tolerance:  
 
どんな宗教が輸入されても,  寛容な気持ちで日本の神様の仲間として取り入れ…” 
(Wajikan  2015). 
 
Whatever religion  has come  to  Japan,  with  a  tolerant  spirit,  it  enters  as  the  friend  of  
the Japanese gods. 
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This strategy, then, may be seen as an attempt to negate the inferential relationship 
between religion and S. Behaviour may, indeed, denote religious behaviour, but religious 
behaviour does not imply S. In fact, religious behaviour and the negation of elements of S 
are consistent with the Japanese context, it is said. Therefore, these behaviours and the 
negation of S as a whole, assuming S is conjunctive, is also consistent with the context. 
And that is equivalent to the negation of the implication, from religious behaviour to 
theocratic behaviour, in question. Passages like the above also tend to obfuscate the 
historical relation to S. As can be seen from the second quoted passage, it seems religion 
in Japan has never be consistent with S as a whole, but rather with its negation. That 
undermines the narrative provided by the occupation forces.  
Naturalism 
It is fairly often emphasised that religion in Japan involves a plural number of 





Discovery 2011).  
 
Shinto,  from  its  very  beginnings,  a  religion  that  had  a  vast  number  of  gods  and that  
is  free  of  the  belief  in  a  single  god,  scripture,  and  special  doctrine,  is  the worship  
of  an innumerable number of gods  that  inhabit  every  part  of  nature,  for  example,  
natural disasters, weather, wild animals, rocks, forests and mountains. 
 
The real emphasis of the plurality connects religion in Japan to a deep veneration 
for nature. This reverence is explicit in responses to surveys carried out on religious 
attitudes in Japan. In a 2008 Yomiuri Shinbun survey of religious attitudes, for instance, 
participants were asked about a recent change to the education law. The law would allow 
the teaching of general religion in the classroom. Respondents were asked what they 
thought should be taught. Approximately 70% said a respect for life and nature (Yomiuri 
Shinbun 2008).   
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This can be seen, again, as the willingness to accept that behaviours denote 
religious behaviours, but as an attempt to break the back of the implication from these 
behaviours to S. In this case, since religion and a reverence for life and nature are 
consistently associated, religious behaviour does not imply death and politics. This, 
assuming S is a conjunction, negates the general implication from religion, especially 
Shintoism, to theocratic behaviour. So far as this is related to the beginnings of religion in 
Japan, again, as far as Shintoism is concerned, the historical origins of this negation are 
secured. That, again, puts strain on the occupation interpretation of Japanese religion 
before the war, especially associated with Shintoism.  
Naturalism and Irreducibility 
The naturalism above is apparently related to animism and ancestor worship. Ama 
(1996) argues that this is why religion in Japan is thought to be distinct from other religions 
by ordinary people and, ultimately, not really religion at all. In essence, people are using 
the relation between nature and animism and ancestor worship to make the behaviours 
and practices in question irreducible to religious behaviour and practice. In this case, the 
symbolic relation between behaviours and their appearance is tackled. Behaviours that 
appear religious, actually, according to most Japanese people, according to Ama, denote 
behaviours that are not really religious at all. This rests on the conflation of religion with 
American/European religion.  Again, so far as the historical relation between religion and 
S is concerned, it is obfuscated since nativist behaviours are not really religious at all in 
Japan. 
Irreducibility to Dogma, Scripture and Founders 
Religion in Japan is also understood by many to be irreducible to doctrines, 
scriptures, or a founding teacher. Of course, this can only begin to make sense if religion 





典に記されている (Izumu-ooyashiro  Murasakino  Kyokai).   
 
Although Shinto  has  no  doctrine,  scripture,  or  founder,  it  is  a  big  mistake  to  think  
that  Shinto  has nothing  to  teach. Although  there  isn’t   the  same  kind  of  troublesome  
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teaching  found  in  Buddhism and  Christianity,  words  of  wisdom  on  how  to  live  life  
are  contained  in  many classics like the Shojiki, Nihonshoki, and Manyoshu. 
 
In this case, the discourse suggests that the presence of religion is accepted. 
However, it also implies that such religion hasn't the same kind of troublesome or confusing 
features as other religions found from other areas of the religious universe but is, 
nevertheless, related to wisdom found in the classic texts of Shintō mythology. Thus, again, 
symbols of behaviour if denoting religious behaviour do not denote S, since S involves 
dogma, scriptures, and a reductive origin to a founding family line. If S is a conjunction of 
its elements, the inferential relation between religion, again, associated with Shintoism, 
and theocratic behaviour is falsified. And, again, so far as Shintoism, through its texts, 
stretches back to primordial Japan, historical relations are obfuscated.   
Irreducibility to Religion 
Religion in Japan is said to be practiced without real religious identity. The 
reluctance of Japanese people to identify themselves or their behaviours with religion can 
be pronounced. It is summed up by the vast majority of Japanese folk identifying with the 
無宗教 (Mushūkyō) category in surveys of their religious attitudes and behaviours (NHK 
and ISSP 2009). The Japanese literally translates as “no-religion.” Global statistics also 
confirm this kind of self-categorisation (Noack 2015). Again, such an argument can be 
seen as a narrative strategy that tries to reassign the value given to behaviours. Such 
behaviours no longer denote the behaviours of a religious actor and, thus, such acts are 
not related to S if ever such behaviours were. Moreover, interestingly, for Japanese people 
not only behaviours that appear to be religious but behaviours that may even denote 
Shintoist behaviours or Japanese Buddhist behaviours, all fail to denote the behaviours of 
a religious actor. This leads to apparently paradoxical classifications: Shintoists, Buddhist 
and adherents of no religion lack mutual exclusivity, they are merely cultural and thus 
unified. That is, one might identify with the first 2 categories as well as the third. Again, it 
also helps to obfuscate the historical relations, since there is not really any religion in 
Japan.  
A strange quasi-academic counterpart to the emphasis in question is found in the 
idea that because the term ‘Shūkyō’ purportedly did not exist in Japan prior to its use to 
translate the term ‘religion,’ religion did and does not exist in Japan. It's a strange view 
since, first, it overgenerates as many terms actually did not exist in Japan until they were 
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engineered to translate imported terms and concepts and, second, in general, the 
conclusion does not follow from the premises. This argument, again, seems to seek to 
reassign the value associated with the behaviours in question, what look like religious 
behaviours, thereby, do not denote religious behaviour but behaviours that are indigenous 
to Japan and merely look religious to western outsiders. Again, the historical paradigm is 
undermined.4 
 
The Whole Narative 
Thus, we have a discourse today that associates religion in Japan with syncretism, 
pluralism, tolerance, life and naturalism, irreducibility to dogma, scriptures, founding or 
primary teachers and, in fact, disassociates it with actual religion and religious 
classification. Given the viability of this discourse, religious behaviours in Japan now come 
to exemplify predicates that break the back of the inference that associates religion in 
Japan with attributes contained in S or undermines the assignment of behaviours to 
religion altogether and obfuscates history. The discourse goes some way to destigmatising 
a set of practices and behaviours that are deeply ingrained in the lives of ordinary people 
and their culture, such as the 法事 (Hōji) remembrance ceremony or the visiting of the 
infamous 伊勢神宮  (Ise Jingū) shrine, a Shintō shrine with deep connections to the 
ideological past but which retains a special place in the hearts of many Japanese people—
about 7 million people a year visit it (Ise Shrine 2011). If the historical relations are true at 
all, it no longer, according to the discourse in hand, has anything to do with the true nature 
of religion in Japan, which in its indigenous forms isn't actually religion at all or if it is,  has 




To sum up. The stigmatisation process involves embodied symbols like the 
behaviours and historical relations relevant to this case. These symbols denote. According 
to the discourse associated with the occupying forces in the present context, such symbols 
can denote theocratic behaviours or religious behaviours from which theocratic behaviour 
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historical reading is paradigmatic. There is, then, some entrenchment here. Individuals who 
embody such behaviours in the Japanese context and are in some way related to the 
historical relation may be classified as theocratic actors and they become examples of 
theocratic actors. It is likely that such classifications will harm the individuals in question, 
not least psychologically. Therefore, it is unlikely that class membership and the resultant 
social identity will be accepted. It seems it isn't.  
Likely ways to react against the classification are symbolic mobility or systematic 
creativity. The behaviours and historical relations are unlikely to be erased. The behaviours 
are highly valued and the historical relations are paradigmatic. Thus, systematic creativity 
is most likely to be taken up. Indeed, that is, as argued above, what happens. A discourse 
is produced. So far as the behaviours in question denote religious behaviour, religious 
behaviour is constant with non-theocratic elements, which falsify the inference from 
religious behaviour to theocratic behaviour. Or/and the behaviours in question actually do 
not denote religious behaviour at all, which means the inference from religious behaviour 
to theocratic behaviour is inapplicable to the Japanese context. Last, since a negative 
inference relation to theocratic behaviour or a lack of denotative relation to religious 
behaviour exists, the occupation discourse that tied religious behaviour to theocratic 
behaviour is obfuscated. 
Thus, in terms of the present discourse, individuals embody symbols like behaviours 
and primordial historical relations to the religions (or sometimes ‘nonreligions’) of Japan. 
These classify the individuals concerned and the individuals concerned become examples 
of non-theocratic actors if at all religious. In a modern world, that kind of class membership 
is likely to be viewed positively and class membership and the resultant social identity is 
likely to be highly prized. High self-esteem and prestige can be conjectured, which is 
evident from the quoted passages above. Tajfel and Turner suggest the kind of response 
adopted as antagonistic. But we argued it doesn't have to be, but is often likely to be. Is it 
in this case? Unfortunately, it seems so. The historical aspect of the occupying discourse 
is obfuscated, though paradigmatic and, therefore, likely to lead to outright conflict. Nishi 
(1982) mentioned above is a scholarly example of this. Moreover, the destigmatising 
discourse makes its case for non-theocratic identity by contrast to religions perceived to be 
non-Japanese, and particularly with reference to the US or Europe (and often does so using 
a set of false comparisons). Thus, it is implied that non-Japanese religions of that kind are 
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theocratic or tend to a more theocratic notion of religion. Thus, as Tajfel and Turner think, 
antagonism is an implication of what I called systematic creativity in this context.  
In general, then, religion in Japan provides an excellent example of a once 
stigmatised and latterly destigmatised religion. This should be of some relevance today 
given the continuing stigmatisation of religions like Islam.  
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